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Introduction and Summary
For a quarter of a century, the United States savings bond program
has been an important instrument of federal debt management. To
describe its particular role and significance, however, it is appropriate
to cite analogies in an area as distinct and far removed from federal
debt management as the policies and practices of the nation's private
savings institutions. With respect to the marshaling of funds for the
Treasury, the program follows the classic pattern established many
years ago by these institutions. It seeks to attract the small savings of
large numbers of individuals by offering a combination of financial
incentives that emphasizes safety of principal, liquidity, and convenience
to the unsophisticated investor. Sayings bonds are also similar to savings
accounts at private financial institutions in that they are continuously
available for purchase by investors and their yields are relatively in-
flexible. Moreover, the program utilizes the far-flung of the
savings institutions to sell and redeem savings bonds and relies heavily
on their support. Indeed, from the standpoint of investors it may be
said—always bearing in mind, however, that savings bonds are direct
obligations of the United States government—that these bonds are more
similar in some essential respects to the obligations of savings institu-
tions than to other types of Treasury securities.
It is because of the distinctive features of the savings bond program
that within the scope of 'an occasional paper it has been accorded
separate treatment in the National Bureau's capital market study. The
demand for marketable Treasury securities will be analyzed in a volume
by Morris Mendelson, to which this paper is a companion study.
This paper is not concerned, except incidentally, with the origins
of the savings bond program or with its operations during World War
II, when it achieved the peak in its quantitative importance as a medium
for personal saving and. Treasury borrowing.. Still less is it concerned
1with the broader problems of war economics, although, in the final
analysis, no meaningful appraisal of the means used to finance federal
expenditures during World War II can fail to take into account the
behavior in later years of holders of savings bonds and other liquid
assets accumulated in wartime. Rather, this paper deals with the period
from the end of World War II to 1960 which witnessed radical de-
partures from the economic and financial conditions under which the
program operated during its earlier history. The transition from war
to peacetime economic conditions, increased competition for individ-
uals' savings, the revival of orthodox monetary policies, and the in-
creased variability and rising level of market interest rates during the
1950's were environmental changes that had a profound impact on the
savings bond program. The need to adapt to these changes is the central,
continuing problem confronting the savings bond program today.
OBJECTIVES ANDTECHNIQUES
OF THE. SAVINGS BOND PROGRAM
The principal objectives of the savings bond program as stated in official
Treasury statements have been to stimulate saving, promote widespread
holdings of -UnitedStates government obligations among individuals,
and limit the amount of "residual" borrowing from the commercial
banlung system. These objectives have been pursued by the savings
bond program under widely varying economic conditions and through-
out the business cycle. In recent years, however, the program has
succeeded oniy in the more limited: accomplishment of maintaining
the total amount of savings bonds outstanding at about the high level
reached at the end of World War II, rather than in exerting a major
impact on the distribution of ownership of the federal debt. Never-
theless, the Treasury continues to seek and has attained positive, if
modest, growth in the outstanding amount of E and H bonds, the
largest element hi the savings bond debt and the only series on sale
since 1957. -
Threemain factors distinguish savings bonds from other types of
securities sold in large amounts by the Treasury during the postwar
period. First, they are designed primarily for individuals rather than
for financial institutions, corporations, or other large investors. The
program provides the Treasury with direôt access'to individuals' savings.
It bypasses private financial intermediaries and competes with them
as well as with other final borrowers for funds held by individuals.
2Second, to a somewhat greater degree than is true of other Treasury
securities, sales, redemptions, and amounts outstanding of savings bonds
depend, in the short run, on the initiative of the public and are; in
practice, independent of close control by the Treasury. The flow 'of
funds to and from the savings bond. program may fluctuate in ways
that are contrary to current over-all debt management objectives,
partly because savings bonds may be liquidated at the option of the
owner at prearranged values. Variations in the flow also reflect the
practice followed by the Treasury of making savings bonds continu-
ously available for purchase by investors and holding their yields fixed
for extended periods of time in the face of changing of return
on alternative investments:
Third, savings bonds are the principal type of nonmarketable
security sold by the Treasury to the public. The choice of a nonmarket-
able security as the primary means of attracting funds from individuals
was motivated largely by a desire to protect unsophisticated individual
investors from the effects of markét value depreciation, and the apparent
preference of many individuals for investments free of market risk.
Numerous alternatives to savings bonds have been suggested,
mainly in order to substitute less liquid securities as means of attracting
savings. Purchasing-power bonds have also been proposed, on the
ground that the government should properly provide the unsophisticated
investor with protection against inflation, which has markedly reduced
the purchasing power of holdings of savings bonds and other liquid
assets during the postwar period.
The various series of savings bonds are similar in basic design,
but vary in some important details. Differences among the various series
partly reflect the Treasury's intention to segregate groups of investors
in order to offer higher yields to individual than to nonindividual in-
They also. reflect efforts to tailor the terms of various series to
investors' preferences.
In keeping with the importance attached to its basic objectives,
the program originally, offered yields at maturity on E bonds well
above those prevailin.g on marketable long-term Treasury bonds and
those offered by major types of private financial intermediaries. How-
ever, yields available on savings accounts rose substantially during the
postwar period, and market interest rates also increased during the
1950's. Consequently, although they were increased in 1952, 1957, and
1959, yields at maturity of savings bonds lost the premium status they
once held. The fact that the savings bond yields were not raised more
rapidly along with other interest rates reflects, in part, the influence of
statutory restrictions 'and reduced reliance on nonmarketable securities
3in debt management policy during the 1950's, particularly as regards
sales of such securities to large investors. It indicates, moreover, the
difficulty of adjusting the program to the regime of widely fluctuating
interest rates that emerged in the 1950's.
Throughout most of the program's history, yields on savings bonds
held for short periods of time have been low in comparison with other
interest rates, making these bonds relatively unattractive to investors
as a medium for short-term investment and inexpensive in terms of
interest cost as a means of short-term Treasury borrowing. The relatively
low yields on savings bonds that are liquidated prior to maturity, as well
as other features, are designed to reduce redemptions prior to maturity.
However, interest "penalties" involved in early redemptions probably
are not effectiveVn retarding redemptions for emergency purposes or
where the alternative is consumer borrowing. Such features also detract
from the competitive position of new issues of savings bonds.
The program incurs substantial noninterest costs, which are borne
partly by private groups, including major competitors for individuals'
savings.
PATTERN OF SAVINGS BOND HOLDINGS
Reflecting the basic objectives of the program, savings bonds are held
primarily by individuals. Owing to restrictions imposed by the Treasury
and a g.reater willingness to assume market risks, financial institutions
hold relatively small amounts.
Survey data gathered by the Survey Research Center of the Uni-
versity of Michigan indicate that savings bonds were held by a large
proportion (30 per cent) of spending units in 1960. They represent a
significant share of individuals' financial asset. holdings. The frequency
of ownership of savings bonds among spending units, however, is
lower than that of savings accounts and life insurance and has declined
markedly since the end of World War II. Furthermore, savings bonds
are held by a lower proportion of spending units and in smaller average
amounts than savings accounts in most financial asset, income, age, and
occupation groups.
Given this over-all difference in extent of ownership, however,
savings bonds appear, to be distributed among spending units in. a
manner similar to that of savings accounts. In contrast to corporate
stocks, which are held mainly by spending units in upper income and
upper financial asset classes, both types of assets are held by large
proportions of spending units in widely different economic situations.
4•The various series of savings bonds are held partly by- different
types of investors. Series E and H bonds are held mainly by individuals,
while a fairly.large proportion of F, G, J, and K bonds .appear to be
held by trust funds, financial institutions, state and local governments,
nonprofit institutions, and other relatively large investors.
• 'POSTWAR BEHAVIOR OF SAVINGS. BOND HOLDERS
In the' perspective of the quarter-century history of the savings bond
program, the most aspect of the postwar, record is the sharply
diminished quantitative importance 'of' savings bonds in individuals'
financial savings. The $48 billion of savings bonds -outstanding at the
end of 1960 was slightly lower than the total at the end of World War II,
despite $7.3 billion of net accrued interest, owing to an excess of re-
demptioiis over 'sales. In' contrast, the amount of savings bonds. out-
standing 'increased by $45 billion during World War II. The decline
since World War II reflected the general reduction in personal saving
in the early postwar 'years, and a massive shift in the composition of
saving in favor of other media, 'resulting from basic economic and
financial changes. The disappearance or weakening of temporary war-
time increased competition from private ITnancial inter-
mediaries, changes in savers' attitudes toward these intermediaries, and
the diminished relative attractiveness of savings bond yields during
much, of the, 1950's were important underlying factors. Also important
were the large amount Of maturities since 1953 and the discontinuation
in' 1957 'of sales of new bonds of Series J and K.
"The postwar period also witnessed sharp short-period fluctuations
in savings bond flows. Net sales (sales less redemptions, measured in
terms of sales price and excluding accrued interest) were positive dur-
ing the 1946-50 period. In each of the subsequent ten years, however,
total net- sales were negative, as redemptions including maturities ex-
ceeded sales. The turning point was marked by the outbreak of the
Korean War in the summer of 1950 and by the Federal Reserve—
Treasury accord in March 1951. After the accOrd, the relative attractive-
ness of fixed-yield savings bonds declined markedly, particularly for
sophisticated investors, in the face of increases in 'rates of return on
competitive investments.. The rise in maturities and discontinuation of
certain series also. coiitributed to 'the decline in net sales.
Net sales declined between 1945 and 1946, mainly because of the
gei'ieral drop in' saving and the 'withdrawal of millions of persons from
the payroll savings plan:!They declined again between1949 and 1951,
5in response to the consumer buying spree that followed the outbreak
of the Korean War and to subsequent capital market, changes. Other
substantial declines in net sales occurred during periods of capital
market stringency in 1956-57 and 1959, as investors shifted from savings
bonds to investments whose yields were more responsive to general
rises in market interest rates. During most intervening years and in 1960,
net sales rose, but not sufficiently to offset these declines.
In analyzing the behavior of savings bond flows, a basic distinction
must be drawn between E and H bonds and other series. Net sales of
E and H bonds, which were available exclusively to natural persons
during most of the period covered by this paper, have been strongly
influenced by major changes in the general level of saving. They also
have been influenced by shifts in the composition of saving in response
to changes in yield relationships, particularly in 1956-60, when yields
on marketable securities fluctuated above and below E- and H-bond
yields. The slower growth of E- and H-bond holdings relative to hold-
ings of savings accounts occurred even though their yields at maturity
for the most part exceeded effective rates of return paid by intermedi-
aries. This suggests that to achieve even the comparatively slow rate of
growth of E-. and H-bond holdings experienced during the postwar
period, the Treasury must offer rates of return as high as or higher than
yields offered by the various types of private intermediaries, probably
because investors may regard- these bonds as less liquid than savings
accounts.
F, C, J, and K bonds have been influenced mainly by general
capital market changes, rather than by variations in over-all personal
saving. After the Federal Reserve—Treasury accord, sales of these
bonds rose during periods of capital market ease, when their fixed
yields were attractive relative to variable capital market yields, and
declined during periods of financial stringency, when the relative at-
tractiveness of their yields decreased. F, G, J, and K bonds responded
more sensitively than E- and H-bond flows to variations in the relation-
ship between their yields at maturity and marketable bond yields, re-
flecting the greater willingness of investors in these bonds to purchase
marketable securities and the greater vulnerability of their lower yields
to rises in market interest rates.
Further diversity of behavior exists between small- and large-
denomination E bonds. Except at the immediate end of the war, net
sales of small-denomination E bonds have been relatively stable, partly
because of regular purchases through payroll deductions.
When net sales data are broken down into their underlying gross
flows, it is evident that variations both in sales of new bonds and in
6redemptions of old ones have been major causes of cha.nges in net flows.
The inability of the Treasury to maintain the attractiveness of new
issues relative to other investments, as well as the ability of holders to
liquidate their bonds without loss, have been major factors of instability.
Annual E-bond redemptions have averaged 13 per cent of amounts
outstanding, considerably lower than rates of withdrawals from savings
accounts, partly owing to interest "penalties" incurred by investors in
liquidating bonds prior to maturity. The rate of redemption of E bonds
has been fairly stable and has shown little tendency to rise above levels
attained in the late World War II years, despite greatly increased in-
centives for liquidation.
ROLE OF SAVINGS IN POSTWAR
SAVING AND FEDERAL DEBT MANAGEMENT
In the pattern of individuals' saving, E bonds perform a role similar to
that of savings accounts, in that they represent a safe, standardized in-
vestment easily available at a large number of sales outlets and may
be readily converted into cash without risk of loss. Although individuals
differentiate between savings bonds and savings accounts to some extent,
they are both suitable for unsophisticated investors who seek invest-
ments free of market and credit risks. As is true of other fixed-value
obligations, savings bonds have suffered losses in purchasing power
as a result of postwar inflation.
The $6.3 billion rise in savings bond holdings of nonfarm house-
holds during the 1946-50 period, which represented 8 per cent of gross
financial saving and 27 per cent of the total gain in their combined
holdings of savings accounts and bonds, probably diverted to the
Treasury funds that would have been saved through other media, except
to the extent that the program may have stimulated total saving. While
the incidence of the diversion of the flow of funds effected through the
program during this period is difficult to ascertain, it probably was
borne partly by competing private financial intermediaries and thus
tended to reduce total capital market investment of these intermediaries.
During the 1950's, by contrast, the program experienced an outflow,
as redemptions exceeded sales, which, in most years of the period,
augmented the flow of funds into intermediaries and other nonfederal
investment media.
In addition to consideration of the impact of postwar savings bond
flows, "stock" effects of wartime accumulations of savings bonds and
other liquid assets should be taken. into account. Large holdings of
7savings bonds built up during wartime may have stimulated the post-
war propensity to consume, more. so than accumulations of less liquid
securities, but the magnitude of this difference in impact is difficult to
estimate. Liquidations of savings bonds may 'also have, financed post-
war dissaving, but, on balance, hive. been offsetsales
and net accrued interest. During 1946 and during the Korean War,
however, consumer dissaving. financed by E-bond liquidation con-
tributed to some degree to the upsurge in spending and militated
against the effectiveness of consumer credit controls.
In Treasury debt management, savings bonds, as the principal
means used to attract funds from individuals, occupy a unique position.
Direct borrowing from individuals has enabled the Treasury to tap
the flow of funds at a point where investors' preferences and demand
conditions may be relatively favorable for the Treasury. Savings bonds
account for the bulk ,of nonmarketable Treasury debt held by private
investors, and represent the principal departure from the policy in effect
the 1950's of placing.primaryreliance on marketable. securities
in debt management. The continued usesavings, bonds, in contrast
to the termination in re.cent years of the sale of other types of non-
marketable securities to private. investprs, reflects partly the practical
problem of .offsettingthe stream of redemptions as well as the basic
objectiveof broadening the distribution of securities among individuals.
In view of many investors' preference for investments free'of risk,
redeemable, nonmarketable savings bonds represent a less expensive.
means than marketable securities of attracting .savingsfrom large
numbers of individuals. . .
Moreover,E bonds remained outstanding, on the average; for
nearly. eight years, and thus, have some of thç characteristics of
mediate- and long-term Nevertheless,. the..flow of funds into
and out of the program has. varied considerably.. Net redemptions of
savings bonds during periods of capital market stringency may compel
the Treasury to increase market' offerings at a time when it would be de-
sirable to refrain from doing so because of rising interest rates on market-
able securities and, in order to assure that. the Federal Reserve will be
free to take restrictive monetary policy 'actions., However, net redemp-
tions of savings 'bonds were moderate ui magnitude' in most years and
have 'not .posed the serious problem that might. have been expected.
During the' early postwar' sale of savings bonds provided
funds for the retirement of marketable securities. Since the securities
retired were necessarily short-dated,. while a large proportion of the
savings bonds sold at the' time.remained. outstanding for several years,
the program was engaged. essentially. in a funding :.The .pro.
8'ceeds of savings bond sales, together with the much larger amounts
derived from reduction of. Treasury balances and other sources, were
used, in part, to reduce the amount. of Treasury securities held by the
commercial banking system.
During each year of the period 1951-60 by contrast, net redemp-
tions of savings bonds exerted a cash drain. on the Treasury, but the
magnitude of this drain was relatively small until 1956-80. The peak
outflow occurred in 1957, when net redemptions, together with other
pressures on the Treasury's cash position, forced it to increase its cash
offerings of marketables in the face of sharply rising market interest
rates. The cash outflow rose sharply again in 1959, but in this year the
pronounced increase in individuals' purchases of marketable Treasury
securities suggests that investors, in effect, merely exchanged savings
b(inds for higher-yield marketable Treasury securities.
Notwithstanding net redemptions during the 1950's, savings bonds
continued to be a major element in the structure of the federal debt.
At the end of 1960, savings bonds represented 16 per cent of the total
amount of United States government securities outstanding, 23 per cent
of the amount held by all nonfederal investors, 33 per cent of the hold-
ings of noncommercial-bank investors, and 68 per cent of the amount
held by individuals—about the same proportions as at the end of World
War II. Over the span of the fifteen-year period since the. end of
World War II, savings bond holdings of individuals increased slightly.
The demonstrated willingness of individuals to maintain and increase
their holdings during the postwar period contrasted sharply with the
pronounced reduction in Treasury security portfolios of major types of
institutional and corporate investors. The contrasting behavior of in-.
dividuals and institutional investors appears, to reflect, in part, differ-
ences in investment preferences and the willingness of the Treasury
to offer relatively generous yields on savings bonds during the early
years of the program.
While continuing to 'be an important element in the federal debt
structure, the savings bond program as a whole may also become in
the future a more significant source of new funds for the Treasury, after
the overhanging volume of outstanding bonds of discontinued series,
already greatly reduced, further, and is. extinguished by re-
demptions and maturities.. The ability of the savings bond program to
channel funds to the Treasury will depend on how thoroughly it adapts
its techniques for attracting new funds from individuals to the changing
financial environment. . .. . .
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